Abstract. We show that supersingular Abelian varieties can be used to obtain higher MOV security per bit, in all characteristics, than supersingular elliptic curves. We give a point compression/decompression algorithm for primitive subgroups associated with elliptic curves that gives shorter signatures, ciphertexts, or keys for the same security while using the arithmetic on supersingular elliptic curves. We determine precisely which embedding degrees are possible for simple supersingular Abelian varieties over finite fields and define some invariants that are better measures of cryptographic security than the embedding degree. We construct examples of good supersingular Abelian varieties to use in pairing-based cryptography.
Introduction
In this paper we show that supersingular Abelian varieties can be used to obtain higher MOV security per bit, in all characteristics, than supersingular elliptic curves. We also give a point compression/decompression algorithm that allows one to take advantage of elliptic curve algorithms and software while obtaining shorter transmissions, signatures, ciphertexts, and keys. We also define the "cryptographic exponent" and "security parameter" for supersingular Abelian varieties and prove that they are closely related to the embedding degree but are better measures of cryptographic security. We determine precisely which embedding degrees are possible for simple supersingular Abelian varieties over finite fields. We also construct optimal supersingular Abelian varieties to use in pairing-based cryptography.
For pairing-based cryptography, it is useful to have Abelian varieties with embedding degrees that are neither too small (which would lead to poor security) nor too large (which would make computations prohibitive). Supersingular Abelian varieties are a natural source of varieties for these applications.
Elliptic curves are useful in cryptography because they are algebraic groups (also known as group varieties). This implies that they, their group law, and inverse map are all defined by polynomials and therefore are amenable to efficient computer computation, and the group structure gives a discrete logarithm problem on cyclic subgroups. Abelian varieties are exactly the connected projective algebraic groups. Elliptic curves are exactly the one-dimensional Abelian varieties. One of the advantages of using the group A(F q ) of an Abelian variety in place of the multiplicative group F × q of a finite field F q is that there is no known subexponential algorithm for computing discrete logarithms on general Abelian varieties or elliptic curves. While subexponential algorithms exist for Abelian varieties (and elliptic curves) of small embedding degree, such varieties nevertheless have been found to be useful for pairing-based cryptography.
Section 2 below gives some background on Abelian varieties. In Sect. 3 we discuss pairings on Abelian varieties and generalize an elliptic curve result of Balasubramanian and Koblitz. In Sect. 4 we define useful invariants for elementary supersingular Abelian varieties, the cryptographic exponent c A,q and the security parameter α(A, q). In Sect. 6 we relate c A,q to the embedding degree and show that c A,q is a finer and more accurate measure of the cryptographic security. If a prime divides |A(F q )|, then the embedding degree of A over F q with respect to is defined as the multiplicative order of q modulo and (for sufficiently large and for A elementary and supersingular) is c A,q if c A,q ∈ Z and is 2c A,q otherwise. The security parameter α(A, q), which measures MOV security per bit, is c A,q /g, where g is the dimension of the Abelian variety. This allows us to compare security among Abelian varieties of different dimension. Theorem 6.3 below is stronger than Theorem 7 of [38] (except for the harmless > 7 condition), which was stated there without proof. Our setting is that of elementary Abelian varieties, which is more general than the setting of simple Abelian varieties in [38] .
Galbraith [20] gave upper bounds on the embedding degrees (and therefore on the security parameters) for supersingular Jacobian varieties of curves and asked whether his bounds can be improved. Inspired by and building on [20] and making use of results of Zhu, in Sect. 7 we determine exactly which values can occur as the security parameters of simple supersingular Abelian varieties. In particular, we significantly improve on Galbraith's bounds when the dimension is more than two. Note that, since cryptographic security is based on the cyclic subgroups of A(F q ), for purposes of cryptology, it suffices to consider simple Abelian varieties A, i.e., Abelian varieties that do not decompose as products of lower dimensional Abelian varieties. Our results in Sect. 7 imply that if A is a simple supersingular Abelian variety over F q of dimension g, then the security parameter α(A, q) is at most the corresponding entry in Table 1 (where p = char(F q )), and each entry can be attained. A ' * ' means that there are no simple supersingular Abelian varieties of dimension g over F q .
Our results imply that security parameters for simple supersingular Abelian varieties are unbounded (as the dimension of the varieties grows). However, large security parameters require very large dimension. This, computational issues, and possibly security considerations, preclude using high-dimensional Abelian varieties with high security parameters, at least at this time. We therefore restrict the examples in this paper to smalldimensional cases. Our results show that over every finite field, one can attain higher MOV security using four-dimensional simple supersingular Abelian varieties than using supersingular elliptic curves, and supersingular Abelian surfaces attain higher MOV security per bit than supersingular elliptic curves over every finite field of nonsquare size in characteristic = 3. This answers in the affirmative the open question from [6] on whether one can use higher-dimensional Abelian varieties to obtain higher security per bit than [6] 's BLS short signature scheme. In fact, we show that higher security per bit can be attained using only elliptic curve arithmetic, by using our compression algorithm on primitive subgroups associated with elliptic curves. Supersingular Abelian surfaces in large characteristic (especially those that are primitive subgroups coming from elliptic curves) seem especially promising for pairing-based cryptography. In Sect. 8 we discuss the "primitive" subgroups of the restrictions of scalars of Abelian varieties. In Sect. 9 we obtain results on the cryptographic security of primitive subgroups in the supersingular case. Corollary 9.4 gives an algorithm whose inputs are a supersingular elliptic curve E over F q and a "suitable" prime r and whose output is an Abelian variety E r (the rth "primitive" subgroup) over F q whose MOV security per bit is higher by a factor of r/(r − 1). We have E r (F q ) ∼ = A 0 ⊆ E(F q r ), where A 0 is the trace zero subgroup of E(F q r ). It has been pointed out that Theorem 9.2 also shows that only ϕ(r)/r of the bits in Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signatures over fields of the form F q r contribute to the security.
In Sect. 10 we present a compression/decompression algorithm for the points in the trace zero subgroups of elliptic curves over F q r , which compresses by a factor of r/(r − 1). We can make decompression practical when r = 3 or 5. The (de)compression algorithm applied to the examples of Sect. 12 can be used to improve the bandwidth efficiency of any pairing-based cryptosystem, giving shorter transmissions for the same MOV security, while using only elliptic curve arithmetic. In [3] it is shown that for optimized pairing implementations in the supersingular characteristic two case, using our compression on E 3 in general outperforms Jacobians of genus two curves.
Our (de)compression algorithm is analogous to what Lucas-based cryptosystems [35, 47, 48] , XTR [31] , the T 2 -cryptosystem and CEILIDH [39] accomplish for the multiplicative group of a finite field (see [40] ). The restriction of scalars from F q r to F q of an elliptic curve E over F q splits (up to isogeny) into a direct sum d|r E d , where each primitive subgroup E d is an Abelian variety over F q of dimension ϕ(d). Thus, doing cryptography in E(F q r ) reduces to doing cryptography in each E d (F q Pairing-based cryptography originated in papers of Joux [27] and Sakai-OhgishiKasahara [42] and has numerous applications (see [2] ), including tripartite DiffieHellman [27] , identity-based cryptography [4] , and short signatures [6] . We use short signatures as an illustrative example. In [6] , Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham used pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves and asked whether Abelian varieties can be used instead to obtain shorter signatures. We answer this question in the affirmative in Sect. 11. Our modification of the BLS signature scheme multiplies the MOV security of BLS signatures (for supersingular elliptic curves) by r while multiplying the signature size by ϕ(r), thus shortening BLS signatures over F q r by a factor of r/ϕ(r) (if gcd(r, 2qc E,q ) = 1). While we arrived at our method for compressing BLS signatures by studying the arithmetic of Abelian varieties, our algorithm can be performed entirely using elliptic curve arithmetic, without needing to know anything about higher dimensional Abelian varieties. We also give a novel application of primitive subgroups to obtain new instantiations of composite order bilinear groups.
In Sect. 12 we construct good supersingular Abelian varieties to use in cryptography, in both large and small characteristic. In Sect. 13 we discuss some security considerations that arise for the Abelian varieties E r .
We note that primitive and trace zero subgroups were studied by Frey, Lange, Naumann (who did a compression/decompression algorithm for E 3 ), Weimerskirch, and Diem; we thank Tanja Lange for drawing our attention to [12, 17, 30, 37, 53] .
We thank Dan Boneh for asking the question that led to Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2. We thank Steven Galbraith for drawing our attention to [3] .
Notation
Let F q denote the finite field with q elements. Let N denote the set of positive integers. If r ∈ N, write Φ r (x) for the rth cyclotomic polynomial ζ (x − ζ ), where the product is over the primitive rth roots of unity ζ . Note that Φ r (x) ∈ Z[x] and deg(Φ r ) = ϕ(r), where ϕ is Euler's ϕ-function. The positive square root of q is denoted √ q. If K is a field,K denotes an algebraic closure. If G is an Abelian group, let |G| denote the number of elements and let G[m] denote the subgroup of elements of order dividing m.
Abelian Varieties
An Abelian variety over a field K is a connected projective group variety over K. The one-dimensional Abelian varieties are the elliptic curves. It is a theorem that the group law on every Abelian variety is Abelian. From now on, when we say Abelian variety, we mean Abelian variety of dimension ≥ 1. Next we gather some important well-known results concerning Abelian varieties over finite fields, due to Weil, Deuring, and others (see [51] ), that we will use later.
Theorem 2.5. If
A is an Abelian variety over F q , then: 
In (only) the next section, we mention dual Abelian varieties and polarizations. For definitions of dual Abelian variety and the Weil pairing, see, for example, [36] . For a definition of polarization, see, for example, [44] . An Abelian variety is isogenous to its dual. A polarization gives an isogeny from the Abelian variety to its dual; a polarization is principal if this isogeny is an isomorphism. The degree of a polarization is the degree of the isogeny (and this degree is one if and only if the polarization is "principal"). All elliptic curves, Jacobian varieties of curves, and products of principally polarized Abelian varieties are principally polarized Abelian varieties.
Nondegenerate Pairings
We show that having an Abelian variety over F q with a prescribed embedding degree k is sufficient to give a nondegenerate Weil pairing over F q k (assuming a condition on the multiplicity of 1 as an eigenvalue of Frobenius). This answers a question asked of us by Dan Boneh, generalizes an elliptic curve result of Balasubramanian and Koblitz, and is important for scaling pairing-based cryptography to higher security levels. Theorem 1 of [1] shows that if A is an elliptic curve over F q , is a prime, Frey and Rück (Proposition 2.5 of [19] ; see also [43] ) proved that if A is the Jacobian of a curve over F q , is a prime not dividing q, k is the order of q modulo , σ : x → x q is the Frobenius automorphism of F q over F q , and U is the kernel of σ − q in A[ ], then there is a nondegenerate Tate pairing
Theorem 3.1 below is an analogue for the Weil pairing.
If e is a Tate or Weil pairing,
and e(P , Q) = 1, then the map from P to F × q k defined by R → e(R, Q) is injective, where P denotes the group (of order ) generated by P . Thus, as shown in [19, 33] , the discrete log problem in P reduces to the discrete log problem in F × q k . The "MOV security" of P is the discrete log security of F × q k . If e : V × V → μ is a pairing, a subspace W of V is isotropic with respect to e if e(P , Q) = 1 for all P , Q ∈ W . 
by the definition of U and the fact that q k ≡ 1 (mod ), so Q ∈ A(F q k ), and we have (i). The roots of F occur in pairs a, q/a. Thus q is a root of F with multiplicity d.
Since q is not an eigenvalue for the action of σ on W , σ − q is an isomorphism on W . Thus,
Thus, e (P , R) = 1 for all R ∈ W . Since e is nondegenerate, either V = 0 or there is a Q ∈ U d such that e (P , Q) = 1. In either case, it follows that the σ -equivariant
Thus the restriction of e to V × U d is nondegenerate. Since σ is the identity on V and acts via q on μ , σ − q kills Hom(V , μ ) and thus kills U d . Thus
giving (ii) and (iii).
We have q ≡ 1 (mod ) if and only if U = V . If U = V = 0, then (ii) implies that V is not isotropic, and we have (v).
If V is not isotropic, then the restriction of e to V × V is nontrivial but takes values 
Then dim F (U ) = 1, and for all O = Q ∈ U , we have Q ∈ A(F q k ) and e (P , Q) = 1.
Proof. Since 1 occurs with multiplicity one as an eigenvalue of
The hypotheses in Corollary 3.2 imply that (q − 1), since the pair 1 and q occur as eigenvalues of Frobenius, but 1 occurs with multiplicity exactly one.
The Cryptographic Exponent c A,q
We begin by giving definitions of the cryptographic exponent c A,q and security parameter α(A, q) (we originally gave these definitions in [38] ). The security parameter α(A, q) is c A,q /g, where g = dim(A). It measures MOV security per bit and is the relevant measure for comparing security among supersingular Abelian varieties of different dimension. Roughly speaking, for a group G to have security parameter α means that the discrete logarithm problem in G can be reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of a field of size approximately |G| α . The group G = A(F q ) has order approximately q g . We will relate q c A,q to the size of the smallest field F such that every cyclic subgroup of A(F q ) can be embedded in F × . 
If ζ is a primitive mth root of unity and gcd(t, m) = 1, then ζ t is a primitive mth root of unity. The lemma now follows from the definitions of c A,q t and c A,q .
The next definition builds on the definition of "security multiplier" for elliptic curves in [7] , extending it to measure security per bit for higher-dimensional Abelian varieties. Recall the notation G A and f A from Theorem 2.7(iii). Recall that the exponent of a finite Abelian group H is the smallest positive integer N such that NH = 0 (with the group law written additively). See Proposition 3.1 of [55] for a version of the following result that gives more information.
Theorem 4.6 ([55]). Suppose that A is an elementary supersingular Abelian variety over
(ii) If q is not a square then:
Proof. Part (i)(a) is a part of Proposition 3.1(I) of [55] . Thus if q is a square,
If q is not a square and ω is a q-Weil 
Proof. Part (i) follows from Theorems 2.5(ii) and 2.7(iii) and the definitions of G A and ω.
, and (iii) follows. Suppose that is a prime divisor of 2c. If q is a square then by (i, ii) we have 2g
Lemmas
To prove Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 below, we begin with some lemmas. 
Proof. We induct on the number of prime divisors of r (with multiplicity). The r = 1 case is obvious. If all prime divisors of r divide n, then Φ n (x r ) = Φ rn (x) (see [23] ), giving the result. Suppose that r = ps with p a prime that does not divide n, and s ∈ Z. Then
where the first equality is stated in [23] and is easy to show, the second is by induction, and for the third let d = pt.
The Cryptographic Exponent and MOV Security
Suppose that A is an Abelian variety over F q , and p = char(F q ). Theorems 6.3 and 6.1 below show that the cryptographic exponent c A,q captures the MOV security of A. In other words, if A(F q ) has a subgroup C of sufficiently large prime order, then F q c A,q is the smallest extension F of F p such that C can be embedded in the multiplicative group
If A(F q ) has a point of sufficiently large prime order , then Theorem 6.1 shows that c A,q is the smallest positive half-integer k such that q k − 1 is an integer divisible by , while Theorem 6.3 shows that c A,q is in fact the smallest positive rational number k such that q k − 1 is an integer divisible by . Thus the cryptographic exponent c A,q is a finer invariant than the embedding degree (which is the smallest positive integer k such that q k − 1 is divisible by ). For examples that show that the embedding degree can be very far from a good measure of cryptographic security in the case of ordinary (i.e., nonsupersingular) elliptic curves, see Sect. 4 of [25] . First, suppose that n is even (i.e., q is a square). We first show that nc. Since
Theorem 6.1 (Theorem 8 of [38]). Suppose that A is an elementary supersingular Abelian variety over F q , is a prime number, divides |A(F q )|, and 2c
Thus > 3 n/4 ≥ n/2. By our conditions, > 2. Since n is even, it follows that n. If | 2c, then since > 2 and n ≥ 2, (6.1) implies > 3 ϕ(2c)/2 ≥ 3 ( −1)/2 ≥ , a contradiction, so nc.
Continue to assume that n is even. By Theorem 4.6, divides
of n/2 that is relatively prime to 2c. By our hypotheses, Lemma 4.7(i, ii), and the fact that ϕ(ab) ≤ ϕ(a)b for all a, b ∈ N, we have
.
Now suppose that n is odd (i.e., q is not a square). We first show that nc. We have 
8(i), divides
Then there exist σ ∈ H and ν ∈ C such that ν n = ω σ and divides τ ∈G (1 − ν τ ) ∈ Z, where G := Gal(Q(ν)/Q). Replacing ω by ω σ if necessary, we may assume that σ = 1. Write ω = √ qζ m with ζ m a primitive mth root of unity. Then for some d, we can write
Since n is odd, so is t. Since ζ t d is a primitive mth root of unity, there is a δ ∈ Gal(Q/Q) such that ζ t d = ζ δ m . Thus,
Thus t > n/3. Since n is odd and divisible by t, we must have t = n, i.e., d = mn. Thus, divides
since ζ 2 mn is a primitive nc-th root of unity. Thus divides Φ nc (p), as desired.
Definition 6.4. Suppose that V is a connected commutative algebraic group over a finite field
In other words, C(V , K) is the smallest extension F of K such that any attack on the discrete logarithm problem in F × gives an attack on the discrete logarithm problem in all subgroups of prime order in V (K).
Corollary 6.5. Suppose that A is an elementary supersingular Abelian variety over
Proof. Let M denote the compositum of 
The following example shows that the conclusions of Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 are false if the conditions on are dropped (with = 2). Example 6.6. (See Sect. 4 of [25] for related examples for ordinary elliptic curves.) Suppose that p = 2 t − 1 > 3 is a Mersenne prime. Let E be any supersingular elliptic curve over
. Thus, every subgroup of E(F p ) and of E(F p 2 ) of prime order has order 2, so embeds in F × p .
Remark 6.7. Example 6.6 shows that F q c A,q can be larger than the smallest extension F of F p such that every subgroup of A(F q ) of prime order embeds in
The Possible Cryptographic Exponents
Next we determine exactly which security parameters can occur for simple supersingular Abelian varieties. Since cryptographic security is based on cyclic subgroups, for purposes of cryptography, it suffices to consider simple Abelian varieties. Let
Note that W n is finite, and we have W 1 = {1, 2}, W n = ∅ if n is odd and n > 1, Let k denote the largest odd divisor of a natural number k. Throughout this section, p is prime and q = p n . Define 
The next result can be shown to follow from Proposition 3.3 of [54] . Recall that f A was defined in Theorem 2.7(iii) and by Theorem 2.8(ii) is 1 or 2 if A is simple. Corollaries 7.5-7.9 below give the results when n is even and 2 ≤ g ≤ 6, while Corollary 7.10 gives the results when n is odd and 2 ≤ g ≤ 6. 
Proof.
(a) There does not exist such an
(a) c A,p n ∈ {7, 9, 14, 18} if p = 5 or p = 11 or p ≥ 17; (b) c A,p n ∈ {7, 9, 13, 14, 18} if p = 13; (c) c A,p n ∈ {7, 9, 18, 42} if p = 7; (d) c A,p n ∈ {7, 9, 14, 42} if p = 3; (e) c A,p n ∈ {7, 9, 14, 18, 28, 36} if p = 2.
Corollary 7.11 (Corollary 15 of [38])
. Suppose that n, g ∈ N, n and g are odd, g > 1, and p is a prime. Our results show that when the dimension g is 6, then the highest security parameter is 7, and this can be attained if and only if p = 3 or 7 and q is not a square.
In dimension 4, the highest security parameter is 30/4 = 7.5, and this is attained if and only if p = 3 and q is not a square. This surpasses the elliptic curve case, where the highest security parameter is 6. In fact, Corollaries 7.7 and 7.10(iii) show that dimension 4 surpasses dimension 1 over every finite field.
Over every finite field of nonsquare order and characteristic = 3, supersingular Abelian surfaces surpass supersingular elliptic curves.
In dimensions 2 and 3, the highest security parameter is 6, which ties the elliptic curve case. The supersingular Abelian surfaces with security parameter 6 are in characteristic 2, while supersingular elliptic curves with security parameter 6 occur only in characteristic 3; there may be efficiency advantages in using Abelian surfaces over binary fields, rather than elliptic curves over ternary fields.
Primitive Subgroups
In this section, L/K is a cyclic extension of degree r and V is a connected commutative algebraic group over K. In this paper, we are interested in the case where V is an Abelian variety (usually an elliptic curve) over a finite field. In [39, 41] , we consider the case where V is the multiplicative group G m .
The Weil restriction of scalars Res
See, for example, Sect. 1.3 of [52] for the definition and properties of the Weil restriction of scalars. For now, write V 's group operation multiplicatively.
where N L/F : Res L/K V → Res F/K V is the natural map that induces the usual norm maps
This is the meaning of the notation E r and E r , including E 3 and E 5 that we use below. The variety V L/K is the variety V L of [32] , and N L/F is the map R L/F,V of Remark 5.11 of [32] . The primitive subgroup V L/K is a commutative algebraic group over K of dimension ϕ(r) dim V , and V L/K (K) consists of all elements of V (L) whose norm down to V (F ) is the identity for every intermediate field k ⊆ F L (see Theorems 5.5 and 5.8 of [32] ). Note that V K/K = V . There is an isogeny defined over K (see [13] or Theorem 5.2 of [32] ): 
and is the trace zero subgroup of E(L) (see also Sect. 3.2 of [18] and [30] ). When E is an elliptic curve, E r was studied in [37, 53] .
Boosting the Security Parameter
In this section we use primitive subgroups to boost the security parameter of supersingular elliptic curves or, more generally, supersingular Abelian varieties, by a factor of r/ϕ(r). It follows from Theorem 9.2 that if E is an elementary supersingular Abelian variety over F q , gcd(r, 4qc E,q ) = 1, and the primitive subgroup E r (F q ) ⊆ E(F q r ) has a point of prime order 2c E,q , then E r (F q ) is as cryptographically secure as E(F q r ) against the known subexponential attacks on the discrete logarithm problem in (F q · F q rc E,q ) × . Recall the notation f A and G A from Theorem 2.7(iii) (so f A = 1 exactly when the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius is irreducible). Theorem 9.1 and Corollary 9.4 below are variations on Theorems 24 and 17 of [38] , respectively. Theorem 9.1 (Theorem 5.9 of [32] ). Suppose that r ∈ N, Z is the set of primitive rth roots of unity, E is an Abelian variety over F q , and
Then E r is an Abelian variety over F q , and
Theorem 9.2. Suppose that E is an elementary supersingular Abelian variety over F q .
Fix r ∈ N such that gcd(r, 2qc E,q ) = 1. Then:
the set of primitive rth roots of unity, and letting H r (x)
, and E r (F q ) has a point of prime order
Proof. By Theorem 5.5 of [32] , E r is isomorphic over F q r to E ϕ(r) , so is a supersingular Abelian variety of dimension ϕ(r) dim(E). We have 9.2, (8.2), and (8.4). For (v) , by Theorem 9.2(v) it suffices to consider the case f E = 1 (and r > 2). By Remark 9.3 and Theorem 9.1, f E = 2, q is a square, and 
Proof. Parts (i-iv) follow from Theorem
G E r (x) = (x + ζ j r √ q) or (x − ζ j r √ q),
A Method of Compression and Decompression
We present a method for compressing and decompressing points in trace zero subgroups of elliptic curves (which was given in [38] , with additional details in [40, 46] ). Note that the methods of this section hold for general elliptic curves, without the restriction that the curves be supersingular. Our compression/decompression algorithm is practical when r = 3 or 5. A compression/decompression algorithm was given in Sect. 3.3 of [37] in the case where r = 3 and q = p is a prime congruent to 4 or 7 (mod 9) (an English translation was given on p. 18 of [53] ); we thank a referee for pointing this out to us.
The General Method; r Odd
Suppose that
is an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , and r is an odd positive integer. Let
the trace zero subgroup of E(F q r ). When r is prime, then A 0 is the primitive subgroup E r defined in Definition 8.1. .2) to obtain r equations in the r unknowns, and solve that system of equations. The finite set of solutions for S includes s 0 . We thus obtain a finite list of candidates for s. (iii) Use (10.1) to solve for t (discarding any candidate s 0 's that do not produce a t ∈ F q ).
The compression algorithm is clearly efficient, since it just consists of dropping t and one coordinate of s. We found a way to make decompression practical when r = 3 or 5, the two cases most relevant for cryptographic applications. We demonstrate this in Sects. 10.3-10.5 below.
To be sure of recovering P , rather than a different point in E(F q r ), the compressor can augment the compressed point (s 1 , . . . , s r−1 ) by some extra bits that allow the decompressor to determine which solution of the system of equations to choose to obtain s 0 (and which of two possibilities to choose for t). However, this makes compression less efficient, since the compressor must determine all the solutions of the system.
Explanation of the Method
We now explain where (10.2) comes from. Let X and Y denote the coordinate functions on the elliptic curve E. Since Tr F q r /F q (P ) = O E , there is a function F (X, Y ) on E with simple zeros at the points σ i (P ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, a pole of order r at O E , and no other zeros or poles. Writing P = (s, t), then the function g(X) :
, where σ is a generator of Gal(F q r /F q ), can be viewed as a function on E with zeros at ±σ i (P ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, a pole of order 2r at O E , and no other zeros or poles. Thus,
whereF is F composed with multiplication by −1 on E, and γ ∈ F × q . We can write
and
Since X has a double pole at O E and Y has a triple pole at O E , it follows that deg(h 2 ) = (r − 3)/2 and deg(h 1 ) ≤ (r − 1)/2. (Note that this is all valid when r = 2 with h 2 (X) = 0 and h 1 (X) = X − s; see Sect. 10.5 when r is twice an odd number.) Write
with the α i 's and β i 's in F q . Now combine (10.3), (10.4), and (10.5) (and note that γ must be −1) to obtain (10.2).
The Case r = 3
Suppose that r = 3 and the characteristic of F q is not 3. We give an efficient decompression algorithm. Under our assumptions, we can take a 2 = 0 in (10.1) and can take the irreducible polynomial defining the degree 3 extension F q 3 to be of the form f (z) = z 3 + r 1 z + r 0 with r i ∈ F q . Then the characteristic polynomial of multiplication by
The difference of the two sides of (10.2) is now Setting the coefficient of the quadratic term of (10.6) equal to 0 and solving for S gives
Substituting into (10.6), setting the coefficient of the linear term equal to 0, and solving for α 0 gives
Substituting into (10.6) and setting the constant term equal to 0 gives a degree 8 polynomial in The compressor can transmit three extra bits so that the decompressor can determine the decompressed point with no ambiguity (two to determine which root of the degree 4 polynomial m to choose, and one to determine t).
r = 3, Characteristic 2
When r = 3 and q = 2 n with n not divisible by 3, we may take r 0 = r 1 = 1. If further a 1 = 0 in (10.1), then decompression becomes easier if the compression algorithm drops s 1 or s 2 , rather than s 0 . In that case, setting the coefficient of the quadratic term of (10.6) equal to 0 yields the equation s 0 = α 2 1 . Solving for α 1 amounts to taking a square root. Using the linear term of (10.6), one obtains
a quadratic polynomial in s 1 (or s 2 ). So the decompression algorithm reduces to taking one square root in F 2 n and solving one quadratic polynomial over F 2 n . Taking square roots in a field of characteristic 2 is just a single exponentiation, and solving a quadratic equation is not much harder. If q ≡ 1 (mod 3), we can take r 1 = 0, and then R is a root of When a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = 0, an equation for E 3 in A 3 over F q (μ) where μ is a primitive cube root of unity was given in [17] , (4.16) of [37] , Sect. 3.2 of [18] , and Sect. 2.4.1 of [12] , namely
Naumann [37, 53] gave a compression/decompression algorithm in the case where r = 3 and q = p is an odd prime congruent to 4 or 7 (mod 9).
r = 5, Characteristic 3
Let q = 3 n with gcd(n, 30) = 1. We will make the decompression algorithm efficient for the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 − x − 1 over F q . (A similar computation can be done for y 2 = x 3 − x + 1. Both these curves have security parameter 6, which is maximal among all supersingular elliptic curves over all finite fields.) Write
is the characteristic polynomial of multiplication by
Taking the difference of the two sides gives
Setting the coefficient of the degree four term equal to 0 and solving for β 0 gives
Setting the coefficient of the cubic term equal to 0 and solving for α 1 gives
Let ρ 1 and ρ 2 be the two roots of H (t) in F q (corresponding to the two linear factors above, in the same order). Then
All three of δ, δ + 1, and δ − 1 give s 0 's such that 4 i=0 s i z i is the x-coordinate of a point in the trace zero subgroup of E(F 3 95 ).
Remark 10.2. On a Macintosh desktop computer with a Dual 2.5 GHz PowerPC G5 processor running OS 10.4.7, using the computational algebraic number theory software package KASH3 [29] to compute the resultant and find its roots, using y 2 = x 3 − x − 1 decompression takes about 300 ms when q = 3 19 and takes about 700 ms when q = 3 43 (these values of q are good parameters in the sense that they are in a cryptographically useful range and the order of the trace zero subgroup is divisible by a large prime). This could be sped up by writing a dedicated program.
The Case r = 2m with m Odd
Suppose that E is an elliptic curve over a field K, and F is a quadratic extension of K. Let E denote the quadratic twist of E corresponding to F /K. Then E F/K is isomorphic to E over K (see Example 1.5(ii) of [32] ), and Res F/K E is isogenous over K to E × E by (8.2) . Note that in this (r = 2) case σ (P ) = −P ; since the x-coordinates of points in the trace zero subgroup E F/K (K) ⊂ E(F ) lie in K, they are already compressed.
More generally, suppose that M/K is a cyclic extension of odd degree m, and let L = F M. Then L/K is a cyclic extension of (even) degree r = 2m. By Proposition 5.10 of [32] 
Thus, to study the primitive subgroup E L/K we are reduced to studying the primitive subgroup (E ) M/K .
Shortening Cryptographic Transmissions
We explain how to use the results of this paper to shorten transmission sizes in pairingbased cryptography. (See also [38] and Sect. 4 of [40] .) We illustrate this concretely in the case of short signatures.
Shortening Transmissions Using Abelian Varieties
Pairing-based cryptography can be performed using Abelian varieties and a Weil or Tate pairing on the -torsion, with not the characteristic of the field, if the Abelian variety has a polarization whose degree is prime to . The pairings can be efficiently computed for supersingular elliptic curves and for Jacobians of supersingular hyperelliptic curves (and Jacobians of nonsupersingular curves of low embedding degree). Our "optimal" Abelian varieties in Sect. 12 give good supersingular Abelian varieties to use.
Shortening Transmissions Using Primitive Subgroups
Theorem 9.4 shows that MOV security can be boosted by a factor of r/ϕ(r) by going from a supersingular elliptic curve E over F q to a primitive subgroup E r over F q . One could view E r as an Abelian variety of dimension ϕ(r) and do pairing-based cryptography for that Abelian variety (if one can compute the pairings). A better way, just using elliptic curve arithmetic and pairings, is to view E r (F q ) as a subgroup of E(F q r ), use the arithmetic in E(F q r ), and use our (de)compression algorithm in Sect. 10 to shorten cryptographic transmissions for pairing-based cryptography by a factor of 4/5 (when r = 5) or 2/3 (when r = 3), while preserving MOV security.
RS Compression of BLS Signatures
We first recall the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [6] . Let E : y 2 = f (x) be a supersingular elliptic curve over F q , and let P ∈ E(F q ) be a point of large prime order . Let c denote the cryptographic exponent c E,q defined in Definition 4.5. Let e: P × P → F × q c be a pairing that satisfies e(P , P ) = 1 and e(aP , bP ) = e(P , P ) ab for every a, b ∈ Z. One can use a modified Weil or Tate pairing for e. The public information is q, E, P , , e, and a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → P . Alice's private key is a randomly chosen integer a in the range 1 ≤ a ≤ , and her public key is P A = aP . To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , Alice computes P M = H (M) and aP M = (s, t) ∈ P . Alice's signature is s ∈ F q (and an optional additional bit to recover the sign of t). To verify the signature, Bob computes t = √ f (s) ∈ F q , sets Q = (s, t), and checks that e(P , Q) = e(P A , P M ) (and also checks e(P , Q) = e(P A , P M ) −1 if the additional bit was not sent). In [7] , Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham suggest using MNT elliptic curves [34] in place of supersingular elliptic curves. MNT curves are ordinary elliptic curves of embedding degree 3, 4, or 6.
In the Rubin-Silverberg (RS) modification of the BLS signature scheme, the signer compresses the signature using the algorithm in Sect. 10, and the verifier decompresses the signature before verifying. Take q and supersingular E as above, except that if q is a square take E so that √ q is not a q-Weil number for E (it suffices to take E with embedding degree > 1). Let p = char(F q ), let r be a prime that does not divide 2pc E,q , and let P be a point of large prime order in the trace zero subgroup of E(F q r ) (in practice, this will mean taking P ∈ E(F q r ) of sufficiently large prime order). Take a pairing e and a hash function H as above, where now c := c E,q = c E,q r . Alice's private and public keys are as in the BLS scheme. To sign M, as before, Alice computes P M = H (M) and aP M . Alice's signature is the compression of aP M given by the algorithm in Sect. 10. To verify the signature, Bob uses the decompression algorithm of Sect. 10 to produce the finite set of possible decompressions {Q i } ⊂ E(F q r ). Bob verifies that e(P , Q i ) = e(P A , P M ) for some i (if additional bits are sent, Bob need only check this for one i, but the signer then needs to perform extra work to compute the additional bits).
The RS modification produces signatures that are r−1 r as large as the corresponding BLS signatures. By Corollary 9.4, any attack on the RS modification of the BLS signature scheme corresponding to P ∈ E r (F q ) ⊂ E(F q r ) gives an attack on the security of the BLS signature scheme corresponding to P . In both cases, the security relies on the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem in the subgroup generated by the point P . Compared with BLS, RS signing is no more work than BLS signing, and RS verification requires an additional reconstruction step to recover s; for applications with a powerful verifier, this is not a problem.
New Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Recently, composite order bilinear groups have been used to solve important problems including partial homomorphic encryption [8] , noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs [24] , searching encrypted data [5] , efficient group signatures [10] , and fully collusionresistant traitor tracing [9] . Supersingular elliptic curves have been the only secure instantiations of composite order bilinear groups (Sect. 2.1 of [8] ), namely, Boneh et al. fix an RSA modulus n, take the smallest positive integer m such that mn − 1 is a prime ≡ 2 (mod 3), and use the n-torsion points on E : y 2 = x 3 + 1, a supersingular elliptic curve over F with + 1 = mn points and with c E, = α(E, ) = 2.
The following algorithm gives a new method for constructing composite order bilinear groups. It makes use of the Abelian varieties E 3 and E 5 , for which Sect. 10 gives efficient (de)compression algorithms, and for which one can rely on elliptic curve arithmetic without needing knowledge of higher-dimensional varieties.
Let p and q be primes ≡ 1 (mod 6), and let n = pq. Take an integer that has order 6 modulo p and an integer that has order 6 modulo q and use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain an integer z ≡ 2 (mod 3) that has order 6 modulo both p and q. Take the integer m of smallest absolute value such that z + 3nm is a prime (by Dirichlet's Theorem, there are infinitely many primes of the form z + 3nt). Then E : y 2 = x 3 + 1 is a supersingular elliptic curve over F with + 1 points and F E (x) = x 2 + . By Theorem 9.1,
). Thus c E 3 , = 6, α(E 3 , ) = 3, and |E 3 (F )| = 2 − + 1 = Φ 6 ( ), which is divisible by n since has order 6 modulo n. Similarly, if p and q are primes ≡ 1 (mod 10), n = pq, and is a prime ≡ 2 (mod 3) that has order 10 modulo p and q, then |E 5 (F )| is divisible by n, c E 5 , = 10, and α(E 5 , ) = 2.5. In this way, E 3 and E 5 give new composite order bilinear groups, whose orders are RSA moduli n. However, for fixed RSA security, while the MOV security per bit improves on the construction in [8] by a factor of 3 2 (resp., 5 4 ), one needs twice (resp., four times) as many bits, so RSA security per bit is worse. Thus, the construction in [8] seems to be the best available option.
Supersingular Abelian Varieties to Use in Pairing-Based Cryptography

Optimality
We consider a supersingular Abelian variety over a finite field to be "optimal" if it has the highest security among Abelian varieties of that dimension over the same field. Definition 12.1 (Definition 16 of [38] ). An optimal supersingular Abelian variety over F q is a simple supersingular Abelian variety A over F q such that c A,q ≥ c B,q for every simple supersingular Abelian variety B over F q of the same dimension as A.
Optimal supersingular elliptic curves are well known. For example, over F p n with n odd, the elliptic curves y 2 = x 3 + ax are supersingular and optimal (with c E,p = 2) if 3 < p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and 0 = a ∈ F p , the curves y 2 = x 3 + b are supersingular and optimal (with c E,p = 2) if 2 < p ≡ 2 (mod 3) and 0 = b ∈ F p , the curves y 2 + y = x 3 + x + 1 and y 2 + y = x 3 + x are supersingular and optimal (with c E,q = 4) if p = 2, and y 2 = x 3 − x ± 1 are supersingular and optimal (with c E,q = 6) if p = 3 and gcd(n, 6) = 1.
Thanks to Table 1 , over F p n with n odd, to obtain higher MOV security per bit than for supersingular elliptic curves one can use supersingular Abelian surfaces when p = 2 or p > 7, and supersingular Abelian four-folds when p = 3 or 5 (in fact for all p, but surfaces do at least as well when p = 3, 5). We construct optimal examples below (as we did in Sects. 5.2 and 5.1 of [38] ).
When p = 7, one could use the supersingular Abelian three-fold that is the Jacobian J of the curve y 2 = x 8 + x 4 + 5x 3 + 6x 2 + x + 2 over F 7 n (when gcd(n, 14) = 1), which was shown in [20] to have embedding degree 14, and thus α(J, 7 n ) = 14 3 . By Table 1 this is optimal and improves MOV security by a factor of 2 1 3 over supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic 7.
When q is a square, to obtain higher MOV security one could use Abelian four-folds. One can either use the g = 4 part of Example 12.3 below, or take the Abelian four-fold E 5 for an elliptic curve E with c E,q = 3 (by Corollary 9.4, if p = 5, then c E 5 ,q = 15 and α(E 5 , q) = 
Optimal Supersingular Surfaces
When p > 3, start with an optimal supersingular elliptic curve E over F p (so c E,p = 2). By Corollary 9.2, the Abelian surface E 3 over F p n has α(E 3 , p n ) = 3 for all odd n and thus by Table 1 is optimal. When gcd(n, 6) = 1, the Jacobian of the curve y 2 + y = x 5 + x 3 over F 2 n was given in Galbraith's paper [20] and has c A,q = 12 and α(A, q) = 6, so is an optimal supersingular Abelian surface over F 2 n .
When n is odd and q = 2 n , there are exactly 2 isogeny classes of elliptic curves E over F q with c E,q = α(E, q) = 4, namely those of C + : y 2 + y = x 3 + x + 1 and C − : y 2 + y = x 3 + x. Applying Corollary 9.4 with these curves and r = 3 produces two Abelian surfaces C
2 n e 2πi/24 , and
By Corollary 9.4(ii) (or directly from the definition), c C ± 3 ,q = 12 and α(C ± 3 , q) = 6. Using the characteristic polynomials to compute |C ± 3 (F 2 n )|, sample values of prime n for which |C + 3 (F 3 n )| is of a size suitable for cryptographic applications and has a large prime factor are n = 109, 113, and 127, for which the largest prime divisor of |C + 3 (F 3 n )| has log 2 ( ) = 189, 173, and 207, respectively. For C − 3 , take n = 103, 113, and 139, for which log 2 ( ) = 193, 193, and 201, respectively. In each case, when used in the RS modification of BLS signatures as in Sect. 11.3, the signature length is 2n, log 2 ( ) measures the discrete log security, and 12n = log 2 (q c A,q ) measures the MOV security.
Optimal Supersingular Four-Folds
Suppose that gcd(n, 6) = 1, let q = 3 n , and let E ± be y 2 = x 3 − x ± 1. These two curves give the two isogeny classes of elliptic curves over F q with c E,q = 6. Let ( When q = 2 n with n odd, Corollary 9.2 with the elliptic curves C ± of Sect. 12.2 and r = 5 implies that α(C ± 5 , q) = 5, so the Abelian four-folds C ± 5 are optimal over F q . By [16] , the Jacobians J of y 2 = x 5 − x ± 1 are supersingular Abelian surfaces over 
Optimal Jacobians when q Is a Square
In the next result, we take superelliptic curves C 1 (in fact, Fermat quotients) over F q defined by polynomials of degree n, whose Jacobian varieties A 1 have cryptographic exponent 1 over F q 2 , and twist them by characters of Gal(F q /F q 2 ) of order n to produce curves over F q 2 whose Jacobian varieties are simple ϕ(n)/2-dimensional Abelian varieties of cryptographic exponent n. They have the advantage of occurring in arbitrarily large characteristic. We obtain optimal Jacobian varieties over finite fields of square size.
See [15] for supersingular Jacobians J of curves of genus Proof. The dimension g of A γ is the genus of C γ . From the formula for the genus of C ±1 given on p. 55 of [11] and the fact that the genus of C γ is independent of γ it follows that g = ϕ(n)/2. Let F = F q 2 .
Since q ≡ −1 (mod n), Theorem 20.15 of [45] shows that the Frobenius endomorphism of A 1 over F is multiplication by −q. In particular, the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius of A 1 over F is (x + q) 2g . By Theorem 2.5(v), A 1 is supersingular. By Theorem 2.7(iii), A 1 is elementary over F . By definition, c A 1 ,q 2 = 1. Since every A γ is isomorphic to A 1 over the algebraic closureF , every A γ is supersingular.
The endomorphism ring EndF (A γ ) contains the group of nth roots of unity μ n in F , where ξ ∈ μ n acts on C γ by sending (x, y) to (x, ξy). Fix an nth root δ of γ . Then δ q 2 is also an nth root of γ . Let ζ = γ (q 2 −1)/n = δ q 2 −1 . Then ζ n = 1, so we can view ζ ∈ μ n ⊂ EndF (A γ ). We have the commutative diagram Suppose that γ generates F × modulo nth powers. Then ζ is a primitive nth root of unity, and since n is odd, −ζ is a primitive (2n)th root of unity. The characteristic polynomial of −[ζ ] on A γ is divisible by Φ 2n (x) and has the same degree 2g = ϕ(n) = ϕ(2n), so they are equal. Thus F A γ ,q 2 (x) = ξ (x − ξq), product over primitive (2n)th roots of unity ξ , which is q ϕ(2n) Φ 2n (x/q). Since Φ 2n (x) is irreducible, so is F A γ ,q 2 (x). Therefore, A γ is simple, and c A γ ,q 2 = n. By Theorem 2.8(i), A γ (F ) is cyclic and |A γ (F )| = q ϕ(2n) Φ 2n (1/q) = Φ 2n (q). (g, n, a, b) where in the last row is a prime, 1 ≤ α, β ≤ − 1, and α + β = . Let q be a prime power congruent to −1 (mod n), F = F q 2 , and γ a generator of F × modulo nth powers. Let C be the curve y n = γ x a (1 − x) b and A its Jacobian variety. Then by Theorem 12.2, A is simple and supersingular, genus(C) = dim(A) = g, c A,q 2 = n, A(F ) is cyclic of order Φ 2n (q), and 2n is the smallest integer k such that |A(F )| divides q k − 1. In the table, if g = 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, or if g > 3 and g is a prime of the form ( − 1)/2, then 2n is the largest element of W 2g , so A is optimal by Theorem 7.2. Optimal examples over F with g = 1 and 5 are obtained by taking = 3 and 11 in the last row, and nonoptimal examples with g = 2 and 3 by taking = 5 and 7 in the last row.
Example 12.3 (Example 21 of [38]). Suppose that
Security
For pairing-based cryptography, the security comes from both the Abelian variety discrete log security and the MOV security. Theorem 6.3 shows that the MOV security comes from F q c A,q . Allowing c A,q to take half-integer values when q is a square means that c A,q correctly captures the MOV security of supersingular Abelian varieties, unlike the embedding degree, which is 2c A,q when c A,q / ∈ Z (and is c A,q otherwise). Joux and Lercier [28] recently examined the security of the discrete log problem in F × q n for "moderate" q. They point out that their variant of the function field sieve should be taken into account when computing MOV security for Abelian varieties in low characteristic, such as when char(F q ) = 3 and c A,q = 30 or 6, and when char(F q ) = 2 and c A,q = 12, especially when q = 2 n with n composite.
Gaudry (Theorem 1 of [21] ) has a probabilistic attack on the discrete log problem in A(F q ), for A a g-dimensional Abelian variety, with runtime O(q 2−2/g ) up to logarithmic factors, and with the constant depending (badly) on g. His method is based on index calculus. Viewing the trace zero subgroup E 5 as a 4-dimensional Abelian variety over F q , Gaudry's attack on E 5 (F q ) runs in time O(q 3/2 ) up to log factors, with a large constant. Asymptotically, this is better than Pollard Rho's O( √ q g ) = O(q 2 ) (though the crossover point with Pollard Rho has not been determined). Applied to the trace zero subgroup E 3 , viewed as an Abelian surface over F q , Gaudry's attack is O(q) up to log factors, which is no better than Pollard Rho.
By (8.1) and (8.2), solving the discrete log problem in the primitive subgroup E r (F q ) essentially solves the discrete log problem in E (F q r ) .
A referee has alerted us to a new preprint of Diem and Scholten [14] that gives an attack on the discrete logarithm problem for trace zero subgroups of nonsupersingular Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2, that can be viewed as a variant of the Weil descent attack [22] . Further work is needed to determine whether this has implications for primitive subgroups associated to supersingular elliptic curves or Abelian varieties.
Conclusion
We define the cryptographic exponent and security parameter for elementary supersingular Abelian varieties over finite fields and relate them to the cryptographic security and the embedding degree. We determine exactly what values can occur. We give a compression algorithm that compresses points on the trace zero subgroup of E(F q r ) by a factor of r/(r − 1), for which we can make decompression efficient when r = 3 or 5. We construct optimal supersingular Abelian varieties to use in pairing-based cryptography. We use our results on primitive subgroups, our compression algorithm, and our constructions to shorten pairing-based cryptography transmissions and keys in the supersingular case. We give a generalization to Abelian varieties of an elliptic curve result of Balasubramanian and Koblitz.
